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SMILE. HOW PREJUDICIAL CAN THE
CANDID CAMERA BE? THE ADMISSION OF
PHOTOGRAPHS IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL
JAMES F. FAGAN, JR.*
Since early childhood we have been taught to clean up our own
messes. Recently, the New York Court of Appeals ("Court of Ap-
peals") became reacquainted with this youthful lesson. The
"mess" that required "cleaning up" was the proper standard for
admissibility of photographs in a criminal trial. Twenty years
ago, in People v. Pobliner,1 the Court of Appeals announced a clear
rule on the admissibility of photographs.2 The Pobliner court de-
clared that relevant photographs are excluded "only if [the photo-
graph's] sole purpose is to arouse the emotions of the jury and to
prejudice the defendant."3 However, in civil cases, the Court of Ap-
peals applied a more stringent test of weighing the prejudicial ef-
fect and balancing the inflammatory possibilities against the pro-
bative value.4 The Court of Appeals was correct in attempting to
move away from the prior rule and missed an opportunity to im-
prove the standard in its recent determination.
* B.A., M.P.A., Long Island University; J.D., St. John's University; LL.M., Columbia
University. I would like to thank Mark Ricca for his excellent research, helpful comments
and interesting suggestions.
1 32 N.Y.2d 356, 298 N.E.2d 637, 345 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905
(1974).
2 Id. at 369, 298 N.E.2d at 645, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 493. In Pobliner, the deceased was found
in her bed with three bullet wounds in her left temple. Id. at 361-62, 298 N.E.2d at 640, 345
N.Y.S.2d at 485. The prosecution attempted to prove that Brenda Pobliner was shot by her
husband as she slept in her home in Merrick, New York. Id. Defendant contended that the
admission into evidence of a large color photograph of the corpse in the bed, and two addi-
tional photographs taken at the morgue was improper. Id. at 369, 298 N.E.2d at 645, 345
N.Y.S.2d at 493.
3 Id.
4 See EDITH FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 134, at 78 (2d ed. 1977). In civil
cases, courts have always been sensitive to the prejudicial effect photographs may have.
Id.; see also Evansville Sch. Corp. v. Price, 208 N.E.2d 689, 690 (Ind. App. 1965). This case
involved the use of a color photograph of the deceased youth lying in his casket. Id.
Although the court noted that the photograph was not gruesome, it was found irrelevant.
Id. at 692.
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More recently, however, several decisions from the Court of Ap-
peals undermined the stare decisis effect of Pobliner.5 This mud-
dying of the evidentiary waters is reflected in decisions of the ap-
pellate divisions. Finally, in People v. Wood,6 the Court of Appeals
purified the water by reaffirming its prior holding on admissibility
of photographs in criminal trials.7 This Article will review the de-
velopment of the standard for admissibility of photographs in
criminal trials in New York, and will demonstrate how the court
has essentially come full circle to reaffirm its prior rule. Further,
recognizing the clich6 that a picture is worth a thousand words,'
this Article will establish that a photograph may be the basis of a
conviction. Finally, this Article will explore the admission of pho-
tographs in relation to the New York State constitutional require-
ment of a fair trial.
I. THE GENERAL USE OF PHOTOGRAPHS AS EVIDENCE
Photographs are real evidence.9 The foundation for a photo-
graph's admission into evidence is laid when a witness, not neces-
sarily the photographer, testifies that the photograph is a fair and
5 The doctrine of stare decisis is important to the development of common law rules, yet
it must be flexible. See James F. Fagan, Jr., Say It Ain't So, Lewis-The Agony of a New
Legal Method Professor, 4 ST. THoMAS L. REV. 149, 151 (1992). Yet, when a court moves
away from a rule, without clearly indicating such a movement, confusion, not order, is the
result and the doctrine of stare decisis is further eroded. Id.
6 79 N.Y.2d 958, 591 N.E.2d 1178, 582 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1992).
7 Id. at 959, 591 N.E.2d at 1180, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
8 See EDWARD CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 212, at 664 (3d ed. 1984). "See-
ing is believing," and consequently a picture, as is true for other real evidence, possesses
unusually strong persuasive force. Id. With respect to real evidence in general, the New
York Court of Appeals noted "when validly and carefully used, there is no class of evidence
so convincing and satisfactory to a court or a jury." See People v. Acevedo, 40 N.Y.2d 701,
704, 358 N.E.2d 495, 497, 389 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (1976). Photographs have been admitted
into evidence since the 1800s. See Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 477-79 (1881) (before and
after photograph of child used to show emaciation due to neglect by custodian); see also
Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213, 224 (1871) (pictures of drowned victims shown to aid wit-
nesses and jury in identifying victims).
9 See CLEA Y, supra note 8, § 212, at 663-81. Nomenclature is always a problem in the
law. Id. Some authorities use "demonstrative evidence" while others use "real evidence" as
the term for the generic class of evidence when the trier of fact uses firsthand sense impres-
sion. Id. In either case, there exists two classes of evidence, one which is involved in an
issue relating to the circumstances in question, and a second used to illustrate, by any of
the senses, an issue related to the circumstances in question. "Real Evidence" is a superset
of both categories, and "real evidence" as the former subset and "demonstrative evidence"
as the latter subset. Real Evidence is defined as "[e]vidence furnished by things themselves
or view or inspection, as distinguished from a description of them by the mouth of the
witness." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1264 (6th ed. 1990). Demonstrative evidence is de-
fined as "[t]hat evidence addressed directly to the senses without intervention of testimony.
Such evidence ... has no probative value in itself." Id. at 432.
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accurate representation of the persons, objects, or scene repro-
duced.' ° A photograph is "a non-verbal expression of the testi-
mony of some witness competent to speak to the facts repre-
sented."" Some courts analogize photographs to maps and
diagrams, holding that they have no independent evidential effect
and operate merely as illustrations. 12 Other courts, however, have
adopted the "pictorial testimony theory of photographs," which al-
lows a photograph to be substantive evidence where there is an
adequate foundation establishing the accuracy of the process pro-
ducing the photograph.' 3
In New York, a properly admitted photograph constitutes direct
evidence capable of proving or disproving any issue in a case, di-
rectly or circumstantially, without need for independent testi-
mony.14 This is particularly important where a photograph is ob-
tained by surveillance cameras, such as those commonly used by
banks. As a general rule, a bank's surveillance camera is trig-
gered by the person's presence and thus, is often the only "eye-
witness." Under these circumstances, it is probable that no one
other than the defendant has first hand knowledge to confirm that
the photographs are a fair and accurate representation of the
scene. However, it is unlikely the defendant will provide such a
10 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 790, at 218-19 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); see also
CLEARY, supra note 8, § 214, at 671; FISCH, supra note 4, § 142, at 83; JEROME PRINCE,
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 137, at 109-10 (10th ed. 1973). The key to a proper foundation
is that the photograph accurately represent the subject matter depicted therein. Any per-
son with knowledge of the subject matter, and not just the photographer, may establish
this foundation. See People v. Byrnes, 33 N.Y.2d 343, 437, 308 N.E.2d 435, 437, 352
N.Y.S.2d 913, 916 (1974). Due to the state of the law, the Byrnes court held that "where no
witnesses are available who have viewed the subject matter portrayed, valid alternative
grounds may exist for authenticating the photograph and admitting it into evidence, such
as testimony, especially that by an expert, tending to establish that the photograph truly
and accurately represents what was before the camera." Id. at 348, 308 N.E.2d at 437, 352
N.Y.S.2d at 917. In Byrnes, the victim provided the foundation for the pictures by testifying
that the photographs were a fair and accurate representation of the objects presented. Id.
at 346, 308 N.E.2d at 436, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 914. However, medieval law did not allow uncor-
roborated testimony to be the basis for a conviction of rape, sodomy, or incest. Id. Thus, the
victim's testimony could not be used to "bootstrap" the photographs into evidence. Id. at
347, 308 N.E.2d at 436-37, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
11 See WiGMORE, supra note 10, § 790, at 218-19 (emphasis omitted); see also Byrnes, 33
N.Y.2d at 347, 308 N.E.2d at 437, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
12 See CLEARY, supra note 8, § 212, at 671; WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 790, at 219-220.
The authors note that the distinction is "essentially groundless" and, in practice, has little
effect.
13 See WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 790, at 219; see also United States v. Rembert, 863
F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
14 See Byrnes, 33 N.Y.2d at 348, 308 N.E.2d at 437, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
148 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 9:145
foundation. 15 Fortunately, New York permits the foundation to be
established by the testimony of the person in charge of maintain-
ing the camera or a person familiar with the scene in the
photograph. 16
II. THE USE OF PHOTOGRAPHS IN NEW YORK CRIMINAL CASES
In criminal actions, courts have disagreed on the proper stan-
dard of admissibility of photographs into evidence. Three differ-
ent tests have emerged to determine whether photographs should
be admitted. One test states that relevant photographs are ex-
cluded only if their probative value is outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.' 7 This test is the one most likely to result in the
photographs being excluded. The second test, essentially derived
from the Federal Rules of Evidence, is that relevant photographs
will be "excluded if their probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."' 8 Clearly, the latter is
15 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Clearly a defendant has a constitutional right not to testify.
However, other means may be utilized to establish that the person in the photograph is the
defendant, such as witnesses that know the defendant or witnesses that are experts in
some field. See United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1987) (orthodontist
specializing in celphalometrics), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
16 See People v. Byrnes, 33 N.Y.2d 343, 348, 308 N.E.2d 435, 438, 352 N.Y.S.2d 913, 917
(1974) (where no witnesses are available, expert testimony may authenticate a photo-
graph); see also People v. Tortorice, 142 A.D.2d 916, 918, 531 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (3d Dep't
1988) (witness need not always testify that photographs were fair and accurate). New York
has determined that a lay witness may give an opinion concerning the identity of a person
depicted in a surveillance photograph "if there is some basis for concluding that the witness
is more likely to correctly identify the defendant from the photograph than is the jury." See
People v. Russell, 165 A.D.2d 327, 333, 567 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (2d Dep't 1991), affd, 79
N.Y.2d 1024, 1025, 594 N.E.2d 922, 923, 584 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1992). The testimony
serves "to aid the jury in making an independent assessment regarding whether the man in
the bank photographs was indeed the defendant, a task made more onerous by defendant's
altering his appearance after commission of the crime." Id. at 1025, 594 N.E.2d at 923, 584
N.Y.S.2d at 429.
17 See, e.g., People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705, 723 (Cal. 1992); State v. Falcon, 494 A.2d 1190,
1195 (Conn. 1985); Green v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1314, 1316 (Ind. 1992); State v. Evans, 586
N.E.2d 1042, 1058 (Ohio 1992); Commonwealth v. Wharton, 607 A.2d 710, 720 (Pa. 1992);
State v. Smith, 602 A.2d 931, 936 (R.I. 1992).
18 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added); see, e.g., State v. Klafta, 831 P.2d 512, 515
(Haw. 1992); State v. Winn, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (Idaho 1992); State v. Eaton, 524 So. 2d
1194, 1201 (La. 1988); People v. Zeitler, 454 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Mayes, 825 P.2d 1196, 1205 (Mont. 1992); State v. Butler, 415 S.E.2d 719, 723 (N.C. 1992);
State v. Williams, 828 P.2d 1006, 1013-14 (Or. 1992).
For purposes of this Article, the discussion is limited to these three tests as they are
employed in state and federal courts. However, it should be noted that language in some
opinions indicates other standards for admission of photographs. One state formulated a
'gruesome test," which requires the state to overcome a presumption of prejudice when the
photographs are deemed gruesome. See State v. Rowe, 259 S.E.2d 26, 28 (W. Va. 1979).
Some courts require that inflammatory photographs be essential to the prosecution's case
in order to be admissible. See Hoffert v. State, 559 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
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the more stringent test. The first test applies a preponderance
standard, while the second test is analogous to a clear and con-
vincing standard. The third test excludes relevant photographs
only if the sole function of admitting the photographs is to preju-
dice the trier of fact.' 9 This test is the most liberal and would be
analogous to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The New
York Court of Appeals has reaffirmed application of the third test.
A review of the New York Court of Appeals' decisions in this
area indicates the lack of stability with this standard. In 1973,
the Court of Appeals in People v. Pobliner,2 ° held that photo-
graphs of a deceased person, no matter how gruesome, were ad-
missible if they tended to prove, disprove, illustrate, or elucidate a
material issue or other evidence offered in a case. 2' Admission is
within the discretion of the trial court and photographic evidence
should be admitted unless it is submitted solely to inflame a
jury.22
After Pobliner, New York's criminal courts regularly admitted
graphic photographs into evidence.23 In fact, it was rare to have
1990). Similarly, another jurisdiction developed an "excessive test" to insure that there be a
limit on admissibility of possible prejudicial photographs. See State v. Hennis, 372 S.E.2d
523, 526 (N.C. 1988).
19 See People v. Wood, 79 N.Y.2d 958, 961, 591 N.E.2d 1178, 1180, 582 N.Y.S.2d 992, 994
(1992) (emphasis added); cf. People v. Fickett, 562 N.E.2d 238, 246 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990)
(photograph "relevant to establish any fact in issue is admissible despite its gruesome
nature").
20 32 N.Y.2d 356, 298 N.E.2d 637, 345 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905
(1974).
21 Id. at 369, 298 N.E.2d at 645, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
22 Id. There is no balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect. Id. In Pobliner, the
prosecution asserted that the defendant killed his wife while she slept. Id. at 370, 298
N.E.2d at 646, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 394. The defendant, however, argued that a burglar sur-
prised his wife and shot her. Id. To rebut the defense's position, the prosecution submitted
four photographs of the victim in her bed in a sleeping position, including one 30-inch by
40-inch blow-up of the deceased. Id. The prosecution also submitted two photographs taken
at the morgue which showed "three clustered bullet holes near the left temple, indicating
marksmanship and deliberateness in the killing." Id. The court held that the photographs
related to material elements of the case and therefore, the trial court acted within its dis-
cretion in allowing their admission. Id.
23 See, e.g., People v. Ervin, 156 A.D.2d 977, 550 N.Y.S.2d 867 (4th Dep't 1989); People v.
Farmer, 156 A.D.2d 1003, 549 N.Y.S.2d 288 (4th Dep't 1989); People v. Long, 155 A.D.2d
558, 547 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep't 1989); People v. Paige, 120 A.D.2d 808, 502 N.Y.S.2d 532
(3d Dep't 1986); People v. Lambert, 125 A.D.2d 495, 509 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep't 1986);
People v. Harrington, 108 A.D.2d 1062, 485 N.Y.S.2d 631 (3d Dep't 1985); People v. Gomge,
108 A.D.2d 870, 485 N.Y.S.2d 366 (2d Dep't 1985); People v. Winchell, 98 A.D.2d 838, 470
N.Y.S.2d 835 (3d Dep't 1983), afl'd, 64 N.Y.2d 826, 476 N.E.2d 329, 486 N.Y.S.2d 930
(1985); People v. Corbett, 68 A.D.2d 772, 418 N.Y.S.2d 699 (4th Dep't 1979), affd, 52
N.Y.2d 714, 417 N.E.2d 567, 436 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1980); People v. McKown, 71 A.D.2d 730,
419 N.Y.S.2d 273 (3d Dep't 1979).
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photographs excluded. 24 When cases involved depraved indiffer-
ence to human life, the relevancy of photographs was rarely
questioned.2 5
In People v. Bell, 26 it seemed as though the Court of Appeals
was testing the waters for possibly overruling Pobliner. In Bell,
during a robbery, a store owner was stabbed approximately fifteen
times by the defendant's partner. Charges of attempted murder
and assault were brought against the defendant.28 The defendant
argued that he was unaware of the stabbings and, therefore, did
not possess the requisite mental culpability to sustain a convic-
tion.29 In order to prove the defendant's "conscious objective," the
prosecution sought the admission of two photographs of the vic-
tim. The photographs involved, showed the victim after she was
stabbed fifteen times and life-sustaining apparatus was inserted
into her body.30 The Appellate Division, Third Department, in
holding that the photographs were relevant stated:
24 Cf People v. Duffy, 93 A.D.2d 865, 866,461 N.Y.S.2d 374, 375 (2d Dep't 1983) (Brown,
J., concurring) (photograph served no useful purpose and should not be admitted).
25 See, e.g., People v. Millson, 93 A.D.2d 899, 900, 461 N.Y.S.2d 586, 588 (3d Dep't 1983)
(post autopsy photograph of deceased child's skull was crucial to prove defendant acted
with depraved indifference); People v. McNeeley, 77 A.D.2d 205, 211, 433 N.Y.S.2d 293, 298
(4th Dep't 1980) (color photographs of deceased child offered to prove defendant beat victim
and placed child in scalding bath water causing severe burns); People v. Arca, 72 A.D.2d
205, 207, 424 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571 (4th Dep't 1980) (photographs of dead infant admitted to
show extent of injuries from abuse).
26 94 A.D.2d 894, 463 N.Y.S.2d 646 (3d Dep't 1983), affd, 63 N.Y.2d 796, 471 N.E.2d 137,
481 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1984).
27 Id. at 894, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
28 Id. at 895, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 647. New York Penal Law § 20.00 imposes criminal liabil-
ity: 'when one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is
criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the
commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such
person to engage in such conduct." N.Y. PENAL LAw § 20.00 (McKinney 1987). The appel-
late division noted that the prosecutor had the burden of establishing defendant's culpable
mental state, the "conscious objective," of assisting in the attempted murder and assault of
the owner. Id.
29 See Appellant's Brief at 8, Bell. Appellant's brief noted that the defendant was with
his accomplice when the accomplice grabbed victim and pushed her into a back room where
the accomplice "placed his hand over her mouth, at the same time drawing a knife and
holding it to her torso." Id. The victim testified that the defendant was not present during
the stabbing.
30 See Bell, 94 A.D.2d at 896, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 649-50. "One photograph depicted the
insertion of a tube into the victim's arm for the purpose of inducing life sustaining fluids
while the other showed approximately 15 wounds in [victim's] body with a knife imbedded
in her back." Id. The prosecution sought introduction of a third photograph portraying the
victim's unclothed body with a knife in it. See Appellant's Brief at 43, Bell. However, the
trial court held it inadmissible. See Record at 321-24, Bell. While it would seem that this
would have been cumulative, not all courts hold that photographs that are repetitive and
cumulative are per se inadmissible. See Weems v. State, 395 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1990); see
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Considerations of the time necessary to inflict so many
wounds, and the concomitant opportunity to exercise a sub-
stantial effort to prevent or hinder the actual commission of
the particular crime, make the photographic evidence rele-
vant to the issues before the jury. The photographs dramati-
cally exhibit the viciousness of the attack on the victim, the
length of time necessary to accomplish the homicidal purpose,
the opportunity for the victim to cry for help, and the opportu-
nity for defendant to respond.31
Two justices dissented and stated the photographs served no
relevant evidentiary purpose. 2 Defendant neither contested the
victim's injuries, nor that a knife was found in her back. There-
fore, the dissent posited that the photographs were not relevant
and served merely to inflame the jury and prejudice the defend-
ant.3 3 While both the majority and dissenting opinions agreed
that the admissibility of the photographs hinged on the issue of
relevance, only the majority believed the pictures were relevant
and admissible.
The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the Third Depart-
ment.3 ' Although the defendant did not seek to overrule the Pob-
liner test,35 the Court of Appeals treated defendant's position as
seeking to do just that, and in the process to substitute a balanc-
ing test which weighed a photograph's inflammatory nature
against its probative value. 6 The Court of Appeals held that even
also United States v. Weeks, 919 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1990) (photograph although cumu-
lative was relevant and therefore admissible).
31 Bell, 94 A.D.2d at 896, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 650.32 See id. (Mahoney, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Mahoney
was joined by Justice Sweeney. Id.
33 Id. Some jurisdictions have allowed photographs on issues that are not contested. See
Richmond v. State, 791 S.W.2d 691, 695 (1990); see also People v. Wood, 79 N.Y.2d 958, 591
N.E.2d 1178, 582 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1992). In Wood, the Court of Appeals seemed to indicate
that the defendant's admission to the murder would not undermine the prosecution's de-
serving to have 44 photographs admitted into evidence. Id. In his dissent, Judge Titone
described the admission as "a barrage of 44 horrid and gruesome photographs and slides of
the battered and unclothed body of the homicide victim, including a number graphically
depicting her in the post mortem examination room prior to her autopsy." Wood, 79 N.E.2d
at 960, 591 N.E.2d at 1180, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (Titone, J., dissenting). In light of the
majority position in Wood it would seem virtually impossible to keep any photograph out of
evidence in a criminal case.34 People v. Bell, 63 N.Y.2d 746, 471 N.E.2d 137, 481 N.Y.S.2d 324 (1984) (Judge Wach-
tler took no part in the decision).
35 See Appellant's Brief at 43, Bell. Appellant's brief clearly started with Pobliner and
applied the test. Id.36 Bell, 63 N.Y.2d at 796, 471 N.E.2d at 137, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 324. The court stated:
"[elven if we accept defendant's contention that the proper test for admissibility of photo-
graphs of a victim being attended in the hospital is a balancing of the inflammatory nature
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if it were to adopt a balancing test, there was no abuse of discre-
tion by the trial court in admitting the photographs." The Bell
court attempted to incorporate a balancing test into Pobliner, but
clearly one was not present." Pobliner allows a trial court, in its
discretion, to exclude any evidence under a balancing approach.
Such discretion, however, generally lies with the trial court when
making an evidentiary ruling, unrelated to the specific test for ad-
missibility of photographic evidence. 9
New York appellate courts continued to apply the Pobliner ap-
proach.41 While some courts applied a pure balancing test,41
of the photographs against their materiality and relevance to the prosecution's case.. ." Id.
However, the Court of Appeals focused primarily on the admission of the photographs as
the only issue being appealed. Id. at 798, 471 N.E.2d at 138, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 325. However,
defendant's brief attempted to use a Pobliner analysis by establishing that the photographs
had no relevant purpose and that consequently their sole function was to inflame the jury.
37 Bell, 63 N.Y.2d at 796, 471 N.E.2d at 137, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
38 See People v. Woods, 79 N.Y.2d 958, 960, 591 N.E.2d 1178, 1180, 582 N.Y.S.2d 992,
994 (1992). Judge Titone noted this by citing Bell as precedent for a balancing test, and
using the "compare favorably" signal for Pobliner. Id. at 961, 591 N.E.2d at 1180, 582
N.Y.S.2d at 994.
39 See Wood, 79 N.Y.2d at 960, 591 N.E.2d at 1179-80, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 994. The majority
illustrated this distinction by setting forth the Pobliner test and, in the last paragraph of
the memorandum, stated that a final determination necessarily involved the trial court's
discretion.
40 See, e.g., People v. Van Ostrand, 157 A.D.2d 875, 876, 550 N.Y.S.2d 147, 148 (3d Dep't
1990); People v. Conethan, 147 A.D.2d 654, 654, 538 N.Y.S.2d 56, 57 (2d Dep't 1989); Peo-
ple v. Reilly, 155 A.D.2d 961, 962, 548 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (4th Dep't 1989); People v. John-
son, 144 A.D.2d 490, 492, 534 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (2d Dep't 1988); State v. Murray, 140
A.D.2d 949, 950, 529 N.Y.S.2d 628, 629 (4th Dep't 1988); People v. Redd, 137 A.D.2d 770,
772, 524 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (2d Dep't 1988); People v. Gordon, 131 A.D.2d 588, 589, 516
N.Y.S.2d 297, 298 (2d Dep't 1987); People v. Green, 134 A.D.2d 516, 517, 521 N.Y.S.2d 291,
292 (2d Dep't 1987); People v. Lambert, 125 A.D.2d 495, 497, 509 N.Y.S.2d 413, 415 (2d
Dep't 1986); People v. Harrington, 108 A.D.2d 1062, 1063, 485 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (2d Dep't
1985); see also People v. Carter, 132 A.D.2d 561, 561, 517 N.Y.S.2d 287, 288 (2d Dep't 1987)
(inflammatory photographs because irrelevant to material issues involved). In People v.
Mercado, 120 A.D.2d 619, 502 N.Y.S.2d 87 (2d Dep't 1986), the court denied admission of
two photographs depicting the defendant posing with two handguns. Id. at 620, 502
N.Y.S.2d at 88. The court's analysis interpreted the Pobliner test as follows:
Thus, the photographs served no purpose other than to improperly portray the defend-
ant as a gun-carrying criminal and the only purpose served by their introduction into
evidence was to persuade the jury that the defendant "was a man of vicious and dan-
gerous propensities, who because of those propensities was more likely to kill with
deliberate and premeditated design." These photographs did not legitimately "tend to
prove or disprove a disputed or material issue .... In fact, their only purpose was to
arouse the jurors' emotions and severely prejudice the defendant. Accordingly, they
were erroneously admitted and, given their highly inflammatory and prejudicial na-
ture, we find that their admission into evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Id. The Second Department utilized the Pobliner test as a justification for the admission of
medical testimony concerning a victim's injury. See People v. Hills, 140 A.D.2d 71, 80, 532
N.Y.S.2d 269, 275-76 (2d Dep't 1988). However, the Hills court also seemed to employ a
balancing test:
We perceive no reason to distinguish between testimonial and photographic evidence
in this regard. Applying the standard set forth in Pobliner, it is clear that the evidence
in the instant case was admitted, not for the "sole purpose" of arousing the emotions of
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others moved, as a result of the Bell decision, toward a balancing
test.42 In some instances, trial courts seemed to integrate the two
approaches.4 3 In Brown v. Henderson,44 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York applied the integrated
approach. The Brown court stated:
[P]hotographic evidence will be admitted into evidence so long
as its probative value is not outweighed by its inflammatory
nature. However, if the sole purpose of the photographs is to
arouse the jury's emotions and thereby prejudice the defend-
ant, the photographs should not be admitted.45
While the rule of evidence on admissibility of photographs
needed clarification, in People v. Stevens,46 the Court of Appeals
further muddied the waters of admissibility of photographs.47 The
trial court admitted a series of photographs of the victim while he
was alive and in good health, and others of his body after he was
stabbed and an autopsy was conducted. A majority of the Appel-
late Division, Third Department, held, except for the live portrait
depicting the victim prior to the assault, the photographs admit-
the jury, but rather, for the legitimate purpose of proving elements of the charged
crimes. On the other side of the scale, the prejudicial effect of the medical evidence in
this case was minimal. Thus, on balance, the evidence was properly admitted.
Id. at 83, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
41 See Green, 134 A.D.2d at 517, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 292 (photographs "were probative of
material issues involving this incident and were not excessively inflammatory or
prejudicial.").
42 See, e.g., People v. Ford, 158 A.D.2d 914, 915, 550 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959 (4th Dep't 1990)
(photograph's probative value outweighed prejudicial effect); People v. Moore, 161 A.D.2d
673, 673, 555 N.Y.S.2d 446, 447 (2d Dep't 1990) ("The pictures ... tended to prove or
disprove material facts at issue and, therefore, any inflammatory effect they may have had
on the jury was outweighed by their probative value."); People v. Snyder, 161 A.D.2d 1205,
1206, 555 N.Y.S.2d 994, 995 (4th Dep't 1990) (photographs admissible if tend to prove or
disprove material element of case); People v. Cuffee, 112 A.D.2d 545, 545, 491 N.Y.S.2d
483, 484 (3d Dep't 1985) (photographs probative and admissible); People v. Davis, 113
A.D.2d 969, 971, 493 N.Y.S.2d 640, 642 (3d Dep't 1985) ("We are unable to conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the inflammatory nature of the evidence
against its materiality and relevance.").
43 See People v. Blake, 139 A.D.2d 110, 116, 530 N.Y.S.2d 578, 581 (1st Dep't 1988). The
court, holding that photographs were erroneously admitted into evidence, stated: "we [can-
not] discern any probative value that these photographs could have which would be suffi-
cient to outweigh their extremely inflammatory and prejudicial effect." Id. This seems to be
a balancing analysis. However, the court ends quoting Pobliner: "[wie conclude, then, that
the photographs were introduced for no other reason than to arouse the emotions of the
jury and to prejudice the defendant." Id. This, on the other hand, indicates a use of a Pob-
liner analysis, omitting any balancing.
44 No. CV 88-3264, 1989 WL 47700 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1989).
45 Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
46 76 N.Y.2d 833, 559 N.E.2d 1278, 560 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1990).
47 See id. at 835, 559 N.E.2d at 1279, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
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ted were relevant to the issue of whether defendant acted with
intent to cause serious physical injury.48 Although the photograph
of the victim prior to the incident was admitted erroneously, the
majority found such error harmless.49 In affirming, the Court of
Appeals stated:
Photographs of the victim's corpse are likely to arouse the
passions and resentment of the jury and thus should not be
admitted unless they tend to prove or disprove some material
fact in issue. When relevance is demonstrated, the question
as to whether on balance the jury should be permitted to view
such photographs is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. The fact that other evidence may be available on
the point is a factor but is not dispositive. The court may find
it appropriate to admit the photographs to illustrate, eluci-
date or corroborate other evidence offered or to be offered at
the trial.5 °
While the memorandum decision cited Pobliner, it failed to cite
Bell. However, the language of the decision more closely echoed
Bell. Nowhere did the Stevens' court discuss that exclusion could
be granted only if a photograph's sole purpose was to inflame the
jury. Rather, Stevens spoke of balancing the evidentiary proof of a
photograph, against its inflammatory character and the availabil-
ity of other relevant evidence. Consequently, Stevens seemed to
join with Bell in laying the foundation to overrule Pobliner.1
Relying on these cases, the First and Second Departments re-
evaluated the admissibility standard. In People v. Cruz,52 the Sec-
48 See People v. Stevens, 153 A.D.2d 768, 770, 544 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (3d Dep't 1989),
affd, 76 N.Y.2d 833, 559 N.E.2d 1278, 560 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1990).
49 Stevens, 153 A.D.2d at 770, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 891. The majority did not elaborate on
why the portrait of the victim was inadmissible, but it would seem to be irrelevant. This
view is supported because the court cited People v. Winchell, 98 A.D.2d 838, 470 N.Y.S.2d
835 (3d Dep't 1983), aftd, 64 N.Y.2d 826, 476 N.E.2d 329, 486 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1985). The
Winchell court held that admission of a portrait was improper because it was irrelevant. Id.
at 840, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 839. But see Spencer v. Georgia, 398 S.E.2d 179, 185 (1990) (use of
portrait photograph of victim while alive admissible to show defendant caused death of
another). Oregon has a statute that requires the court to admit photographs of a homicide
victim while alive to show general appearance and condition. OR. REV. STAT. § 41.415
(1991). Such law declares the photographs relevant and not subject to the balancing test
required of other photographs. See Oregon v. Williams, 828 P.2d 1006, 1013 (1992).
50 Stevens, 76 N.Y.2d at 835, 559 N.E.2d at 1279, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
51 It appears that under the New York Proposed Code of Evidence, the issue of admis-
sion of photographs in criminal cases would parallel that of the present Federal Rules of
Evidence. See Governor's Program Bill No. 224 (1990) (proposing code of evidence). The
Federal Rules of Evidence use a balancing test. FED. R. EvID. 403.
52 176 A.D.2d 953, 575 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dep't 1991).
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ond Department, clearly utilized the balancing test.53 However, in
People v. Watts,54 using Bell as authority, the First Department
held that photographs were admissible if they were not unduly
prejudicial and greatly assisted the jury in its crucial factual
determination.5
Upon reviewing the conflicting standards applied by the lower
courts, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed Pobliner in People v.
Wood.56 In reaffirming the Pobliner rule, the Wood court only
cited Stevens. 7 The majority indicated that a general balancing
was required and it did not intend to require a specific test to de-
termine the admissibility of photographs in a criminal trial.58
Since Wood, the Court of Appeals has never strayed from the Pob-
liner test.
III. RAISING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW TO A HIGHER LEVEL
The test applied in New York to determine the admissibility of
photographs in a criminal trial is the least protective. However,
there has been no constitutional scrutiny of the test for admissibil-
ity of photographs under either the United States Constitution or
the New York State Constitution. Under such scrutiny, the Pob-
liner test would fail.
There are several constitutional issues that can be raised re-
garding the Pobliner test. The first is a challenge to the New York
standard on equal protection grounds. In civil cases, photographs
are only admissible if they are not inflammatory and they assist
the jury." Since the test does not require that the photographs be
excluded if they are presented solely to inflame the jury, the stan-
dard for exclusion is more accessible to the party opposing
admission.6 0
Another constitutional issue to be considered with respect to the
Pobliner test is the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Due Pro-
53 Id. at 953, 575 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
54 183 A.D.2d 409, 583 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1st Dep't 1992).
55 Id. at 410, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
56 79 N.Y.2d 958, 591 N.E.2d 1178, 582 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1992).
57 Id. at 960, 591 N.E.2d at 1180, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
58 Id.
59 See Rivera v. New York City, 160 A.D.2d 985, 985, 554 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (2d Dep't
1990); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 522, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 698 (3d Dep't
1979), affd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
60 See Gallo v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 112 A.D.2d 345, 348, 491 N.Y.S.2d 796, 799 (2d
Dep't 1986).
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cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One goal of the Due
Process clause is to "prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence."6 1 Admission of certain photographs in a criminal trial
could undermine fundamental fairness.6 2 It is clear that either
balancing test would eliminate any potential unfairness, since sig-
nificant prejudice derived from photographs would trigger their
exclusion from the trial. In other words, any prejudice that rises
to a level of undermining the fundamental fairness of the trial
would clearly outweigh the probative value of the photographs so
as to demand exclusion. However, under the Pobliner test, there
is no sufficient safeguard providing protection.
To illustrate the potential of a Due Process violation by applying
the Pobliner test, consider three cases from jurisdictions other
than New York. During the murder trial in State v. Johnson,63
the prosecutor offered testimony of an expert in a blood-spatter
analysis. In connection with the expert's testimony, forty-six color
photographs depicting various blood spatters at the crime scene,
including, some showing the bodies of the victims covered with
blood, were admitted. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the photographs
because the probative value was outweighed by the substantial
danger of prejudice. 64 Under a Pobliner analysis, such photo-
graphs would have been admitted, and would seem to be a viola-
tion of the defendant's Due Process rights.
61 See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
62 See Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483, 1487 (11th Cir. 1989) (photographic evidence not
fundamentally unfair, but may be so gruesome as to violate defendant's right to fair trial);
Bryson v. Alabama, 634 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 1981) (erroneous admission of evidence can
be so prejudicial as to justify habeas corpus relief); cf Romine v. State, 455 N.E.2d 911, 916
(Ind. 1983) ('Prejudice to the right of the accused to a fair trial may outweigh minimal
relevance of photograph of the corpse of the victim in a homicide case and dictate
exclusion.").
63 576 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1990).
64 Id. at 852. In Johnson, the New Jersey Supreme Court asserted that such a balancing
test was settled law and elaborated on the test:
Pictures of a murdered body are likely to cause some emotional stirring in any case,
but that of itself does not render them incompetent. They become inadmissible only
when their probative value is so significantly outweighed by their inherently inflam-
matory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a
reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issue of guilt or innocence.
Id. (emphasis added).
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In Hoffert v. State,65 the prosecution sought to admit an autopsy
photograph of an incision made into the victim's scalp. 66 The pros-
ecutor argued that the photograph showed that the victim re-
ceived separate blows to the head and this disproved defendant's
"heat of passion" defense.67 This argument seems to provide suffi-
cient basis for admission in New York under Pobliner. However,
the Florida District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court de-
termination to admit the photograph, noting that there was other
evidence in the record to establish the prosecution's position.68
The court concluded that "[t]he danger of unfair prejudice to ap-
pellant far outweighed the probative value of the photograph."
69
Consequently, the lack of a fair trial violated defendant's Due Pro-
cess rights.
Lastly, in Banks v. State,7 ° photographs identified as that of the
defendant holding a handgun were admitted into evidence. 7' The
prosecution conceded that the photographs were of "minimal rele-
vance," 72 but the trial court admitted each photograph. The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the photographs were
admitted erroneously 73 and the prejudicial effect outweighed any
minimal probative value.74 Although the case was remanded for
retrial,75 under Pobliner, a New York court could admit the photo-
65 559 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
66 Id. at 1249. The photograph presented the "internal portion of the victim's head after
an incision had been made from behind the ears to the top of the head, with the scalp rolled
away... . "Id.
67 Id. Defendant argued that it was an excusable homicide. Id. at 1247. The death was
the result of a fight where defendant was hit on the head with a bat and soon thereafter
returned with a hunting rifle and shot the victim. Id. Since defendant alleged he received
the worst of the fight and these injuries caused a "heat of passion" response, the condition
of the victim would be probative. Id.
68 Id. at 1249. The court indicated that the "other evidence" showed "that the victim had
broken fingers, bruises above the nose and lacerations on the back of the head." Id. Fur-
thermore, the court noted that the medical examiner could have provided sufficient testi-
mony to establish the prosecution's position. Id. But see Martin v. State, 475 S.W.2d 265,
267 (Tex. Crim. App.) (if verbal description of body would be admissible, so would photo-
graph depicting same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972), overruled on other grounds, Jack-
son v. State, 548 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
69 Hoffert, 559 So. 2d at 1249. The court also indicated that the prosecution failed to
establish the requisites for admission of the photograph. Id.
70 581 A.2d 439 (Md. App. 1990).
71 Id. at 441.
72 Id. at 443 (pictures used to show how police identified defendant).
73 Id.
74 Id. The trial court denied the motion for judgment or acquittal stating: "I'm not even
sure [the photograph is] relevant." Id. at 442. Furthermore, the error was not harmless.
This was demonstrated by the first trial of defendant ending in a mistrial, and the photo-
graph was not used at that trial.
75 Banks, 581 A.2d at 443.
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graphs because of their "minimal relevance." 76 Therefore, regard-
less of the proper application of the Pobliner test, a criminal de-
fendant would be denied a fair trial.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE NEW YORK
STATE CONSTITUTION
An examination of the Pobliner test reveals that it is facially
unconstitutional under the New York constitution." The Due Pro-
cess clause of the New York State Constitution requires that a
criminal defendant be afforded a fair trial.78 The Court of Appeals
has expanded the guarantees afforded to criminal defendants
under the New York State Constitution. 9 Some argue that the
76 One could argue that seeing a defendant with a gun would establish a "criminal pro-
pensity per se" around defendant, thereby establishing an emotional basis for conviction.
Although criminal propensity is not a basis for conviction, such would not fall within the
emotional response of the jury sought to be protected even by Pobliner.
77 See Judith Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 42 REC. OF ASS'N
OF BAR OF CITY OF NEW YORK 285, 297-99. Judge Kaye noted that "the failure to perform an
independent analysis under the State Constitution would improperly relegate many of its
provisions to redundancy." Id.; see also People v. Wood, 79 N.Y.2d 958, 961, 591 N.E.2d
1178, 1180, 582 N.Y.S.2d 992, 994 (1992) (Titone, J., dissenting). Judge Titone stated that
defendant's "constitutional right to a fair trial" was violated. Id. However, Judge Titone did
not indicate whether the violation was based upon the federal or New York State constitu-
tion. In either case, the determination was as applied to the case and not a facial striking
down of the standard.
78 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." Id.; cf People v. Plunkett, 158 A.D.2d 949, 949, 551 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109
(4th Dep't 1990) (defendant not deprived of fair trial when prejudicial evidence concerning
prior physical and verbal abuse was admitted); People v. McMillan, 66 A.D.2d 830,830,411
N.Y.S.2d 634, 636 (2d Dep't 1978) (right to fair trial is fundamental and cannot be denied
even if have overwhelming evidence of guilt).
The Due Process clause was derived from Article 39 of the Magna Carta, which stated:
"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or banished, or any
ways destroyed, nor will we pass upon him, nor will we send upon him, unless by the lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." It was enacted during the Constitutional
Convention of 1821. See ROBERT A. CARTER, NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: SOURCE OF
LEGISLATIVE INTENT 5, n.6 (1988); see also REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF
THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 102 (1821). When the committee made its report to the conven-
tion, the report stated:
That they have had the same under consideration, and although the committee believe
that the principles of civil liberty are well understood, and will be scrupulously re-
garded; yet they are of opinion, that it would be an additional safeguard to the people
to specify distinctly, and adopt some of the most important of those principles; and
they therefore recommend the adoption of the following, as amendments to the
constitution.
Id.
79 See People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 496, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934
(1992). The Court of Appeals has "not hesitated" to interpret the New York State Constitu-
tion independent of the "Federal counterpart when necessary to assume that our State's
citizens are adequately protected from unreasonable governmental intrusions." Id. Further
expansion of rights under other sections of the constitution has not been excluded. Expan-
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"Courts of Appeals' approach to state constitutional claims has
been to discourage litigants from making such claims at all."80
However, the Court of Appeals clearly respects the New York
State Constitution."' Although the provisions of the federal and
state constitutions are similar, this should not inhibit the Court of
Appeals from "reading the parallel clauses independently and af-
sion of free speech rights under the New York State Constitution have been determined to
exist based upon the tradition of tolerance of the unconventional. See People ex rel. Arcara
v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 558, 503 N.E.2d 492, 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (1986).
Although the history provides no significant evidence to interpret the Due Process clause
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, one could argue
that the spirit of scrupulously guarding civil liberty would allow such expansion in this
case. This is based upon the fact that the state "has its own exceptional history and rich
tradition." See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 250, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 914 (1991). Some argue that such history and tradition has not
been well defined so as to establish a legitimate basis to depart from federal precedent. See
James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761,
784 n.82 (1992).
Several judges of the New York Court of Appeals have indicated that providing expanded
rights under state constitutional analysis is appropriate. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Dual
Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 399, 414 (1987); Vito
Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor in a Rough Sea, 61
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 431, 437 (1987); Sol Wachtler, Our Constitution-Alive and Well, 61 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 381, 387 (1987); see also Pete Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and
Protection of Defendant's Rights: The Case of New York 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 157,
192 (1979) (New York courts in criminal cases "have constantly recognized the independent
value of their own Constitutional traditions").
Justice Brennan, recognized as the leader of state constitutional based rights, argues a
reason for state expansion of rights is to allow experimentation, since federalism permits
diversity. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986).
Some argue that Justice Brennan's position "distorts state constitutional analysis." See
Earl M. Maltze, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional
Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 449 (1988). Professor Maltze based his position, in
part, on the fact that courts attempted to expand rights under a state constitution, must
begin with a "floor" established by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 443. Therefore,
state courts allow their state constitutions to be defined by a federal court. Id. at 444. How-
ever, it seems that state courts are adopting the analysis of the United States Supreme
Court and applying it to their own state constitutions. Of course, even after expanding
rights, a state court can find that the experiment failed. See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331,
558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
80 See Gardner, supra note 79, at 783. Professor Gardner believes the message sent by
the Court of Appeals is that it will not treat state constitutional claims "with much atten-
tion or care, so you are probably wasting your time raising them." Id.
81 Professor Gardner believes that the Court of Appeals shows a "grudging character"
with respect to dealing with state constitutional issues. Id. at 781. However, in part, the
reason for lack of full analysis is the frequency of memorandum and per curiam decisions.
During the period from September 1990 to July 1991, the Court of Appeals issued 204
opinions including 79 memorandum and 13 per curiam decisions. See Daniel Wise, Wach-
tler Court at 5: Panel Defies Labels; But Individual Trends Emerge, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1991,
at S3, col. 3. However, in many signed opinions, the Court of Appeals has clearly shown a
willingness to interpret the state constitution.
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fording broader protection." 2 Furthermore, the right to a fair trial
is not determined solely by the value of the past, but also the
State's present value.83 Reasons for expanding rights include:
preexisting state laws defining the scope of the individual right in
question; the history and tradition of New York State in its protec-
tion of individual rights; any identification of the right in the State
constitution as being one of peculiar local concern; and any dis-
tinctive attitudes of the State's citizenry toward the protection of
individual rights.8
CONCLUSION
Under the New York State Constitution, the Court of Appeals
has required that a criminal trial be conducted so that "the proof
will be legal evidence, unimpaired by intemperate conduct, imper-
tinent counsel and irrelevant asides, all of which obfuscate the de-
velopment of factual issues and sidetrack the jury from its basic
mission of determining the facts relevant to guilt or innocence."85
Furthermore, "a fair trial is a paramount constitutional condition
in any judicial proceeding; it is the foundation of a criminal trial, if
justice be its essence."8 6 Clearly, there cannot be a fair trial where
82 See Wachtler, supra note 79, at 412. It is clear that the due process clause was drafted
using the United States Constitution Bill of Rights. PETER GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 45-49 (1991).
83 See Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Century of
American Federation, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 54 (1988). Many believe that the State Constitu-
tion is the most fertile ground for new rights and protections for the next century. See Peter
E. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium
on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 17 (1988). This seems
consistent with Justice Brennan's initial battle cry.
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of
the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore
must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law-for with-
out it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.
See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
84 People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d 762, 704
(1991). Judge Bellacosa believes that there is no noninterpretative analysis any more, but
only conclusory determination that United States Supreme Court's rulings do not ade-
quately protect fundamental constitutional rights. See People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 510,
593 N.E.2d 1328, 1351, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920, 943 (1992) (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
85 See People v. Alicea, 37 N.Y.2d 601, 605, 338 N.E.2d 625, 628, 376 N.Y.S.2d 119, 122
(1975).
86 See LaRocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 574, 582, 338 N.E.2d 606, 612, 376 N.Y.S.2d 93, 101
(1975); see also People v. Bost, 133 A.D.2d 930, 930, 520 N.Y.S.2d 645, 646 (3d Dep't) (no
trial is perfect, record as whole must be considered), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 929, 519
N.E.2d 627, 524 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1987); People v. Jean-Charles, 122 A.D.2d 166, 166, 504
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evidence is "highly inflammatory and capable of arousing a juror's
inchoate fears."87 The Pobliner test needs to be reviewed under
the Due Process clause of the New York State Constitution. Since
Due Process mandates a fair trial, such a review would result in a
determination that a balancing test is more appropriate."8
N.Y.S.2d 544, 545 (2d Dep't 1986) (defendant only entitled to fair trial); People v. Mack, 111
A.D.2d 266, 266, 489 N.Y.S.2d 101, 102 (2d Dep't 1985) (federal and state constitutions
guarantee fair trial, not perfect trial).
87 See People v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 802, 803, 418 N.E.2d 382, 383, 436 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868
(1980) (involved irrelevant racial remarks).
88 See La Rossa v. Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d 583, 588, 468 N.E.2d 19, 24, 479 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183
(1984) ("due process is a flexible constitutional concept calling for such procedural protec-
tion as a particular situation may demand"). Clearly, the state Due Process clause should
remove the potential prejudice interest in the Pobliner test. Although not the focus of this
Article, the court should adopt the balancing test employed under Federal Rule of Evidence
403, which provides sufficient constitutional protection while allowing probative photo-
graphs to be admitted.

